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NOTES AND COMMENTS
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-AGREEMENT NOT TO BE
PERFORMED WITHIN THE SPACE OF ONE YEAR
D URING the past fifty years there has existed in Texas a con-
flict in decisions as to whether or not an oral personal service
contract not to be performed within the space of one year is within
the Statute of Frauds.' Courts holding such an agreement to be
without the Statute have done so on the theory that death of the
promisor inside of a year would amount to performance within a
year.' The contrary result reached by 'Other Texas courts' was
predicated on the proposition that death within a year was not
performance of the contract, but merely an excuse for nonper-
formance. Excuse for nonperformance not being the "perform-
ance" required by the Statute of Frauds, such contracts were held
to be subject to the Statute. This view represents the weight of
authority in this country.'
1 T. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 3995. "No action shall be brought
in any court in any of the following cases, unless the promise or agreement upon which
such actions shall be brought, or some memorandum thereof, shall be in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person by him thereunto lawfully
authorized: ... 5. Upon any agreement which is not to be performed within the space of
one year from the making thereof."
2 Weatherford, M. W. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 88 Tex. 191, 30 S. W. 859 (1895);
Taylor v. Deseve, 81 Tex. 246, 16 S. W. 1008 (1891) ; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Warren,
44 S. W. (2d) 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) writ of error refused; Ford Motor Co. v. Mad-
dox Motor Co., 3 S. W. (2d) 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) writ of error granted, affirmed
23 S. W. (2d) 333; Shropshire v. Adams, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 339, 89 S. W. 448 (1905) ;
Erwin v. Hayden, 43 S. W. 610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) ; and Warner v. Texas & Pac. Ry.
Co., 164 U. 8. 418 (1896).
3 Paschall v. Anderson, 127 Tex. 251, 91 S. W. (2d) 1050 (1936); Chevalier v. Lane's
Inc., 208 S. W. (2d) 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) aflirmed in 213 S. W. (2d) 530;
Wewerka v. Lantron, 174 S. W. (2d) 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) writ of error refused;
Jackman v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 162 S. W. (2d) 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) writ of error
refused; Gulf Ref. Co. v. Boren, 50 S. W. (2d) 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Rease v.
'Clarksville Cotton Oil Co., 248 S. W. 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) writ of error dismissed;
Stovall v. Garder, 103 S. W. 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) ; San Antonio Light Pub. Co. v.
Moore, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 101 S. W. 867 (1907) writ of error refused; Texas Brew-
ing Co. v. Walters, 43 S. W. 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) ; Moody v. Jones, 37 S. W. 379
(Tex. Civ. App. 1896) ; and Milan v. Rio Grande & E. P. Ry. Co., 37 S. W. 165 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1896).
4 49 Am. Jur. Statute of Frauds § 32 (1936) wherein it is stated: "As a general rule,
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The conflict in our courts appears to have arisen from the
early case of Weatherford, M. W. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wood' in
which the Supreme Court of Texas held that an oral contract re-
quiring the railroad company to furnish the Wood family a pass
for ten years was not within the Statute of Frauds because the
death of the family within a year would be complete performance.
In so holding, the Court declared that where there exists a con-
tingency such as death, "upon the happening of which within a
year, the contract or agreement will be performed, the contract is
not within the statute . .. "' The Court was stating a recognized rule,"
but one which did not govern the facts before it because the death
of the Wood family within a year would result not in performance
of the contract, but only in legal excuse for nonperformance. The
Court by way of illustration pointed out that the same rule would
apply to take an oral contract to furnish the family a pass for life
out of the Statute. In this example the Court was correct because
the term of performance would be for life, and death within a
year would not be merely an excuse for nonperformance, but would
be complete performance by the very terms of the contract. This
attempt by the Court to clarify the matter did nothing more than
to emphasize its failure to differentiate between performance and
excuse for nonperformance. During the half-century following the
Wood case it has been cited as controlling by a line of Texas
decisions which have made the same misapplication of the rule
if an agreement cannot be completely performed within a year, the fact that further per.
formance may be excused or rendered impossible by the happening of a contingency,
such as the death of the promisor or another person within a year, is not sufficient to take
it out of the statute, for an excuse for further performance is not the equivalent to full
performance"; 37 C. J. S. Frauds, Statute of, § 48 (1943) ; RESTAT.ME tT, CONTRACTS
§ 198, Illustration 3 (1932) ; 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 496 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
88 Tex. 191, 30 S. W. 859 (1895).
6 Id. at 195, 30 S. W. 859, 860 (1895).
49 Am. Jun. Statute of Frauds § 30 (1936) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 198, Illus-
tration 2 (1932); 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 495 (Rev. Ed. 1936); 20 TEx. Ju,.,
Frauds. Statute oj § 43 (1932).
[Vol. 3
NOTES AND COMMENTS
stated above.' However, during the same period, a greater number
of cases were being decided to the contrary.'
Recognizing that a real controversy did exist and determined to
end it, the Supreme Court of Texas granted a writ of error in the
recent case of Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc."° The plaintiff was suing
for a six months' bonus under an oral contract to render personal
services for the defendant for a period longer than one year. In
return he was to receive a monthly salary and a bonus at the end
of each six-month period. The Court in rejecting the contention
that death within a year would be performance and thus remove
the contract- from the Statute of Frauds expressly overruled that
line of authority represented by the Wood case, and approved
those decisions recognizing the differentiation between perform-
ance and excuse for performance. This decisive action by the Su-
preme Court has not only resolved the conflict among the courts
of Texas, but, in addition, it has placed Texas in harmony with
the majority of the jurisdictions and authority in this country in
holding that an oral contract which provides for a period of per-
formance longer than a year is within the Statute of Frauds even
though death within a year may excuse further performance."
8 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Warren, 44 S. W. (2d) 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) writ
of error refused; Ford Motor Co. v. Maddox Motor Co., 3 S. W. (2d) 911 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928) writ of error granted, afirmed 23 S. W. (2d) 333; Shropshire v. Adams, 40
Tex. Civ. App. 339,89 S. W. 448 (1905) ; Erwin v. Hayden, 43 S. W. 610 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897) ; and Warner v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 164 U. S. 418 (1896).
9 Paschall v. Anderson, 127 Tex. 251, 91 S. W. (2d) 1050 (1936); Chevalier Y.
Lane's Inc., 208 S. W. (2d) 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) affirmed in 213 S. W. (2d) 530;
Wewerka v. Lantron, 174 S. W. (2d) 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) writ of error refused;
Jackman v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 162 S. W. (2d) 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) writ of
error refused; Gulf Ref. Co. v. Boren, 50 S. W. (2d) 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ; Rease
v. Clarksville Cotton Oil Co., 248 S. W. 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) writ of error dis-
missed; Stovall v. Garder, 103 S. W. 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) ; San Antonio Light Pub.
Co. v. Moore, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 101 S. W. 867 (1907) writ of error refused; Texas
Brewing Co. v. Walters, 43 S. W. 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) ; Moody v. Jones, 37 S. W.
379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) ; and Milan v. Rio Grande & E. P. Ry. Co., 37 S. W. 165 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1896).
10 __ Tex. __, 213 S. W. (2d) 530 (1948).
"149 AsT. Jur., Statute of Frauds § 32 (1936) ; 27 C. J. 176 note 74 (1922) ; 47 C. J.
S., Frauds, Statute.of § 48 (1943); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 198 (1932) ; and 2 W'-
LISTON ON CoNTRAcTs § 496 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
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Once a contract has been found to be within the Statute, the
question arises as to whether or not the performance by the plain.
tiff has removed it from the operation of the Statue of Frauds. As
to personal service contracts not performable within the space of
one year, the Supreme Court of Texas took occasion to settle the
law on this point in Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., also.
Assuming the performance of the plaintiff to have been full
performance and relying largely on land contract cases,12 the
court concluded that a contract of employment not performable
within a year is withdrawn from the Statute by full performance
on one side when: (1) the performance is of such a nature as to
render it a hardship on the plaintiff if he is left to recover on a
quasi-contractual basis; and (2) the performance is unequivocally
referable to the alleged contract so as to be ". . • at least a corrobor-
ative fact that the contract was actually made."' 3
As to the first element, it is usually present when the plaintiff
seeks recovery under the contract. It is well settled, however, that
hardship alone is not grounds for relief.'
The second requirement is of English origin." It was early
established to give relief where justice required it, and to do so
without opening the door to fraudulent claims based upon non-
existent contracts.
Although this requisite that the performance be evidence of the
existence of the alleged contract has been criticized," it is now
12 Francis v. Thomas, 129 Tex. 579, 106 S. W. (2d) 257 (1937) ; Clegg v. Brannan,
111 Tex. 367, 234 S. W. 1076 (1921); Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122,229 S. W. 1114
(1921); Lechenger v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 96 S. W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) writ
of error refused; Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922) ; Woolley v.
Stewart, 222 N. Y. 347, 118 N. E. 847 (1918).
8 - Tex. -, _; 213 S. W. (2d) 530, 533 (1948).
14 Wooldridge v. Hancock, 70 Tex. 18 (1888) ; Lechenger v. Bank, 96 S. W. 638 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1906) writ of error refused; Bradley v. Owsley, 19 S. W. 340 (Tex. Civ. App.
1892) ; Gay, Hardship as Taking a Parol Contract for the Sale of Land Out of the Statute
of Frauds, 2 TEx. L. R.v. 347 (1924).
15 Lama v. Bayly, 2 Vernon 627 (1708) ; See Lechenger v. Merchants' Nat. Bank,
96 S. W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) writ of error refused; 49 Am. Jura., Statute of Frauds
420 (1936).
1s 49 AM. Jun., Statute of Frauds § 422 (1936) ; WALsH oN EQurr, 401 (1930 Ed.);
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accepted by several jurisdictions" which, like Texas, have been
reluctant to grant exceptions to the Statute of Frauds. As early as
1858, the Supreme Court of Texas stated:
"Whether possession be an unequivocal act, amounting to part per-
formance, must depend upon the transaction itself. If it be distinctly
referable to the contract alleged in the pleadings, I think no case has
denied that it is a part performance.""' (Italics supplied.)
That the performance be evidence of the alleged contract is essen-
tial to the maintenance of an action for specific performance
based on an oral contract for the sale of land. 9 This requirement
is ordinarily satisfied where there has been payment of the con-
sideration, possession by the vendee, and the making of valuable
and permanent improvements upon the land with the consent of
the vendor."0
Because this requirement grew out of the equitable doctrine of
"part performance","' which is restricted exclusively to land con-
tracts,2 most jurisdictions have not followed Texas in extending
it beyond the section of the Statute of Frauds applicable to land
contracts. The first Texas case to inject this element into contracts
of employment not to be performed within one year was the case
of Anderson v. Paschall 2 in which the Court considered as con-
note, 117 A. L. IL 939 (1938) ; note, 101 A. L. R. 944 (1936) note, 75 A. L R. 652
(1931).
1T West v. McKay, 225 Ala. 397, 143 So. 573 (1932) ; Baker v. Bauchard, 122 Cal.
App. 708, 10 P. (2d) 468 (1932) ; Harmonie Club v. Smirnow, 106 Conn. 243, 137 A. 769
(1927) ; Nelson v. Nelson, 334 Ill. 43, 165 N. E. 159 (1929) ; Dimick v. Snyder, 34 S. W.
(2d) 1004 (Mo. App. 1931); Neverman v. Neverman, 254 N. Y. 496, 173 N. E. 838
(1931) ; Brennen v. Derby, 124 Or. 574, 265 P. 425 (1928) ; and Cannon v. Cannon, 158
Va. 12,163 S. E. 405 (1932).
is Neatherly v. Ripley, 21 Tex. 434 (1858).
9 Francis v. Thomas, 129 Tex. 579, 106 S. W. (2d) 257 (1937) ; Clegg v. Brannan,
111 Tex. 367, 234 S. W. 1076 (1921); Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S. W.
1114 (1921) ; 20 Tzx. Jun., Frauds, Statute of § 115 (1932).
20 Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S. W. 1114 (1921) ; 20 Tax. Jun., Frauds,
Statute of § 116 (1932).S2149 AM. Jun., Statute of Frauds § 422 (1936) ; Gay, Hardship as Taking a Parol
Contract for the Sale of Land Out of the Statute ot Frauds, 2 Tax. L Ray. 347 (1924).
22RsTATEME2IT, CONTRACTS § 197 (1932) ; 2 WIUIsTON ON CONTRACTS § 533 (Rev.
Ed. 1936).




trolling the following statement from Clegg v. Brannan:' "Acts of
performance must be sufficient to identify the contract in them-
selves, and with no other view than to fulfill the particular con-
tract."2 The Court was of the opinion that the plaintiffs' perform-
ance for which they received a reasonable monthly salary did not
give evidence of an alleged oral contract by which they were to re-
ceive a bonus. In Brigg & Co. v. Lokey," decided the same year,
it was held that work done by the plaintiff for which he was paid
by the hour was an act which admitted of explanation without
reference to the alleged oral contract of employment for a term
of two years, for the breach of which the plaintiff was seeking re-
covery. The Court relied upon Anderson v. Paschall and similar
cases.27 Southern Old Line Life Ins. Co. v. MiMs,25 decided since
the above cases, allowed the employee recovery under the oral
contract though his performance was not referable thereto in that
he received a regular monthly salary during the time in which he
claimed to have done extra work contracted for by his employer.
The Supreme Court points out in the Chevalier case that its action
on the writ in the Mims case was by way of an alternative ground
of decision only, and thus was not necessarily an approval of the
case on that point.
The decision in the Chevalier case expressly reaffirms Anderson
v. Paschall, and by citing Clegg v. Brannan and similar cases,29 it
declares in substance that the law as represented by these authori-
ties shall control in the future. Such was held despite the fact that
Justice Simpson, concurring in result only, pointed out that the
weight of authority and better view was otherwise.
24 111 Tex. 367, 234 S. W. 1076 (1921). This case was cited as authority by the court
in Chevalier v. Lane's Inc., - Tex. _ 213 S. W. (2d) 530 (1948).
25 111 Tex. 367, 374; 234 S. W. 1076,'1078 (1921).
26 62 S. W. (2d) 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) writ of error dismissed.
27 Clegg v. Brannan, 111 Tex. 367, 234 S. W. 1076 (1921); Lechenger v. Bank, 96
S. W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) writ of error refused.
28 101 S. W. (2d) 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) writ of error dismissed.
29 Francis v. Thomas, 129 Tex. 579, 106 S. W. (2d) 257 (1937); Hooks v. Bridge.
water, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S. W. 1114 (1921) ; Lechenger v. Bank, 96 S. W. 638 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1906) writ of error refused.
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